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THE FEW AND THE MANY: MACHIAVELLI, TOCQUEVILLE 
AND NIETZSCHE ON AUTHORITY AND EQUALITY 




In Machiavelli’s writings the ruling few go under many different names. In the ancient 
context they are often simply called “the Senate,” but he also refers to them as i grandi, gli 
ottimati, la nobilità and i potenti. The fact that the aristocratic element here appears under a 
wide variety of names, it could be argued, reflects the open nature of the class structure of 
early sixteenth century Florence in general, and its ruling class, the Reggimento, in particular. 
It also seems to suggest that Machiavelli considers the ruling elite to be too complex and 
fleeting a phenomenon to be fixed or contained in a single name.  
Machiavelli’s account of the relation between the people and the nobles displays a 
similar complexity. On the one hand, throughout the Discourses, he describes the Plebs as 
gullible and easily deceived and the nobles as shrewd and cunning. But far from condemning 
the elite’s manipulation of the populace’s religious beliefs for political ends, Machiavelli 
praises it and even exhorts his contemporaries to revive it, as he puts it, by reinterpreting 
Christianity “according to virtue.”  He contrasts the Roman Senate, which according to him 
(D.I.38) “always judged things as they should be judged and always took the less bad policy 
for the better,”  to the rash, undisciplined and imprudent elites of modern Florence. But on the 
other hand, it could be argued, Machiavelli endorses an aggressive and ferocious form of 
popular republicanism in which the general populace, acting as “the guardians of liberty,” 
controls the elites by often harsh and brutal methods. According to Machiavelli, the nobility is 
in need of this check because of its inherent and unquenchable desire to dominate and its 
propensity for corruption, while the people are singularly suited for patrolling the nobility 
because of their love of liberty and their hatred of being dominated. 
The picture is further complicated by the fact that Machiavelli does not treat the elite 
as a uniform or homogeneous class. On several occasions, he distinguishes between the 
prudent and the imprudent parts of the Roman Senate, and he repeatedly identifies a category 
of men, whom he alternately describes as prudent (prudenti) or wise (savi). As a rule, these 
rare individuals belong to the nobility, but they can also be found among the plebs. Refusing 
to view prudence as a class distinction, Machiavelli implies that the good and the prudent 
among the nobles should use the people – and their desire not to be dominated – against the 
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bad nobles, the oligarchs whose desire to dominate poses a constant threat to the liberty of the 
republic.   
From this we may infer that the prudent few – or the prudenti – cannot be identified 
with any of the three recognized constitutional orders, the one, the few or the many. Lacking a 
constitutionally well-defined role, they base their power and influence on their ability to move 
their fellow citizens by means of persuasion and other rhetorical stratagems. From a position 
partly within, and partly outside, the constitution, they manipulate and coordinate the other 
components, using them as their instruments, forming, maintaining and reforming the shape 
of the republic to meet and anticipate changing circumstances. They are not of the people, 
understood as a factional interest, and they should most definitely not be seen as the princely 
element, at least not in the Roman republican understanding, because their role or position 
cannot be identified with those of the consuls. In a sense they can be said to be part of the 
ruling class, the nobility or the few, but properly speaking they exist apart from it, concealing 
their very existence by hiding within it. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to define them as 
the fourth, oblique but indispensable element of the Machiavellian regime. Passing 
themselves off as part of the second element, the great, and needing them as a cloak or as a 
cover, the prudent few are bound at times to act in the interest of the ruling class. But they 
will also make provisions against them, as when they use the people and their representatives 
to counteract or control the oligarchic tendencies of the great. Playing the one order against 
the other – the people against the nobles and vice versa – the fourth element, the prudent few, 
it could be argued, is the only part of the republic that acts in the interest of the whole. But it 
cannot do so openly. In order to avoid becoming embroiled in internal power struggles, it 
must remain hidden, acting covertly in the indeterminate space left constitutionally undefined 
between the three recognized orders. Nor can this elite within the elite publicly claim to 
represent justice or the common good, since such claims are bound to be disputed by the 
interested parties, and dismissed as just another biased opinion among many. Instead, the 
prudent few must act through others and let themselves be known solely by the beneficial 
effects of their manipulations. 
Of course, this interpretation needs to be backed up by textual support and made 
contextually plausible. Here I will have to confine myself to three examples that serve to 
illustrate the position I have been trying to outline for the prudenti. The examples will be 




At the turn of the fourteenth century, when Florence was on the verge of civil war, following 
the promulgation of the so called Ordinances of Justice, a group of clergy – “certi religiosi di 
buona fama” – took upon themselves to act as mediators between the two parties,  the nobles 
and the people. Passing between the camps, they let the nobles know that they had their own 
haughtiness and evil conduct to blame for their recent loss of honors, and they warned them 
that if it came to open confrontation, their reputation and fame would count for little in 
comparison to the factual strength of the people, who were the majority. To the people, they 
preached that “it is contrary to prudence (non era prudenza) to always strive for total victory,” 
and that they should “bear in mind that it is the nobility that has brought honor to the city in 
war, wherefore it is neither good nor just to persecute them with such hatred.” They also 
reminded the people that history gives many examples of a small number of troops having 
prevailed over a numerically superior force. The mediation bore fruit and the people 
eventually agreed on modifying the laws to accommodate the interests of the nobles. During 
this episode – rare, if not unique, in the context of Machiavelli’s Istorie – the prudent priests 
can be said to have acted not only as mediators, but also as a fourth, additional or extra-
constitutional element. They were neither princes, nor did they belong to any of the warring 
parties, the nobles or the people. While it is difficult to portray them as neutral or disinterested 
– since their actions favored the nobles – it would, on the basis of Machiavelli’s account, 
appear that their role, their self-assumed and constitutionally undefined role, had been to serve 
the common good of the emerging republic. 
 
Later in book four of the Istorie fiorentine, we are made to witness a series of attempts by the 
primi cittadini to resurrect the waning nobility and to “ripigliare lo stato.” Speaking like a true 
Machiavellian disciple, Rinaldo degli Albizzi, one of the leaders of the noble faction, here 
outlines how fraud or force can be used to play the two social orders against each other – the 
plebe against the grandi and vice versa. It is part of prudence, Rinaldo claims “to know how 
to avail oneself of men according to the times.” He then goes on to argue that in the same way 
as “our fathers (padri) had used the plebs to repress the insolence of the great,” it is now, 
 
after the great have become humble, and the plebs insolent, well to restrain the insolence 
of the latter by the assistance of the former. To conduct this sort of thing one might 
proceed either by fraud (inganno) or by force (forza), to which recourse can now easily be 




Rinaldo here identifies a category – i padri – to whom he assigns a role resembling the one I 
have begun to outline for the prudenti. Rinaldo’s padri, we may assume, belonged to the old 
nobility, but at the same time they acted from a position outside of their class, or party, which 
allowed them to use “the plebs to repress the insolence of the great.” 
 
As Rinaldo later is seen to adopt a more openly partisan stance, Niccolò da Uzzano, whom 
Machiavelli describes as one of Florence’s wisest citizens – one of the “più savi”– emerges as 
the chief proponent of aristocratic prudence. Opposing the plan to banish Cosimo de’ Medici, 
the leader of the popular faction, on the grounds that the noble party, or its remnants, has 
become too weak and too internally divided to openly confront the united popolo, Uzzano 
makes a most interesting reflection on the dilemma of the prudent man and his claim to 
justice: 
 
If you were to say, the justice of our cause should augment our influence and diminish 
theirs, I answer you that this justice requires to be understood and believed not only by 
ourselves, but by others as well, but this is not the case; for the cause that moves us is 
wholly founded upon our suspicion that Cosimo intends to make himself prince of the 
city. Although we have this suspicion, others have it not; and what is worse, they accuse 
us of the very same thing of which we accuse him. 
 
So, you might have the common good at heart and your cause might be just, but justice and 
the general interest will be of little consequence as long as the majority of men, or the 
stronger party, do not share your perception of things. Therefore, the prudent man should not 
seek to justify his – or her – policies and strategies by claims to justice or the common good. 
To serve these lofty aims one has to operate by more indirect means, often disguising oneself 




Whereas Machiavelli’s classical republicanism conceived of the conflict between the great 
and the people as a permanent feature of social and political life, Alexis de Tocqueville, the 
great modern liberal, accepted the demise of aristocracy and the ultimate triumph of 
democracy as an irreversible historical fact. Whereas Machiavellian prudence had involved 
balancing the interests of the two social classes and preventing either from gaining hegemony, 
Tocquevillean prudence, operating in a different historical and social context, is aimed at 
instilling the principles and values of the old aristocracy in the new, emerging democractic 
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society of the future. Whereas the former had relied on rhetorical manipulation and other 
deceitful stratagems for its balancing act, the latter seeks to enlighten and discipline the 
people by means of education and institutional involvement. 
However, the historical divide that separates Machiavelli and Tocqueville should not 
make us blind to the fact that the two thinkers share many philosophical assumptions and 
political ideals.. Even the most cursory reading makes it clear that the similarites are many 
and striking. For example, Tocqueville describes the French aristocracy and the French people 
under the Old Regime in terms closely recalling those used by Machiavelli in the Discourses 
and the Florentine Histories when portraying the social classes in ancient Rome and modern 
Florence. While Tocqueville’s nobles are an expansive and warlike element with an appetite 
for glory (gloire) and greatness (grandeur), the larger populace are said to be fickle, 
changeable, oscillating between servility and license, but having an ardent love of liberty and 
equality. Like his Florentine predecessor, Tocqueville attributes the destructive effects of 
social conflict to the one-sidedness and partiality displayed by both aristocrats and democrats 
in their quest for hegemony. Also Tocqueville’s insistence that the political man should rise 
above factions, adopt an impartial position and act as an intermediary between the democratic 
and the aristocratic principles, balancing their respective interests and demands, bears a close 
resemblance to Machiavelli’s view of the prudenti.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that aristocratic and democratic prudence 
operate in very different environments. Under aristocractic regimes power, riches, glory and 
l’esprit are concentrated in the hands of a small number of privileged individuals, who exist 
“so to speak outside and above the human condition.” Historians analyzing the premodern 
period are therefore partly justified in attributing the outcome of events to “the particular will 
and the humor of certain men.” In comparison democratic societies are agentless. Here egality 
reigns. The individual is weak and the collective – the State, the nation, the society, the people 
or the multitude –  exceptionally strong. In such a society, which appears to “march on its 
own moved by the free and spontaneous actions of all its members,” the individual tends to 
disappear into the common obscurity of the masses. 
Against this background it is only natural that Tocqueville, hoping to prevent 
democracy from degenerating into despotism, comes to rely not on individual prudent men, 
but on institutional and organizational safeguards such as the judiciary system, the free press, 
civil associations, organized religion and public education. In this connection, the judiciary 
and the legal profession in general (les légistes) take on a particular importance.  
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Thanks to extant letters, working papers and drafts to Democracy in America, we can 
follow in some detail how Tocqueville’s thought on the role of American judges evolved over 
time. During his visit to America from May 1831 to February 1832, he met with a number of 
American lawyers, prosecutors and judges, whose views he recorded in his notebooks. They 
informed him that American judges were “held in very high esteem” but that their 
independence risked being compromised by political pressures and that, in politically 
sensitive cases, they tended to bow to public opinion. Nevertheless, Albert Gallatin, the 
Swiss-born diplomat, senator and opponent of Alexander Hamilton, told Tocqueville during 
their meeting in June 1831, that he regarded the judges as “the regulators of the irregular 
movements of our democracy, and as those who maintain the equilibrium of the system.” 
(192) After a similar conversation in September with Jared Sparks, the historian and future 
president of Harvard University, Tocqueville concluded in his travel diary that “a completely 
democratic government is so dangerous an instrument that, even in America, men have been 
obliged to take a host of precautions against [its] errors and passions ... The establishment of 
two chambers, the governor’s veto, and above all the establishment of the judges.” In 
December the same year, Salmon P. Chase, the senator from Ohio and future Chief Justice, 
echoed Gallatin’s view: “The judges in America are there to hold the balance between all 
parties, and their function is particularly to oppose the impetuousity and mistakes of 
democracy.” But like most of Tocqueville’s interlocutors, Chase admitted that it was difficult 
for judges to fulfill this role, since they depended on the democratic society from which they 
sprang. 
The response to this debate on majority rule, public opinion and judicial independence 
that Tocqueville offers in the first book of Democracy in America, is both brilliant and 
intriguing. Not only did it inspire him to coin the expression, “the tyranny of the majority,” it 
also brought him to reflect upon how American democracy was being played out in the 
nation’s courtrooms, where jury trials brought together the jury – in Tocqueville’s view, the 
chief expression of the principle of the sovereignty of the people –, and the judge – one of the 
most important counterweights to democratic excess . To understand the role of the legal 
profession in American society, Tocqueville argues, one has to realize that it possesses a dual 
or complex character, embodying aristocratic as well as democratic principles. By interest and 
birth, he goes on to explain, American judges and lawyers belong to the people, but by habits 
and tastes (goûts) to the aristocracy. They are “like the natural link between the two things, 
like the chain that unites them.” As representatives of a hidden or oblique aristocracy, they 
stand for such principles as order, form, hierarchy, respect and obedience to principle. At the 
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same time as the law has imposed rigorous restrictions on their authority, it has entrusted 
them with the mission and power to act in the interest of the common good. The judge should 
thus not merely be a good citizen, but also embody the virtues of the classical statesman.  
In a couple of uncharacteristically obscure passages, Tocqueville suggests that an 
invisible, subconscious and almost providential influence is at work in the institutional 
practice of American judges and lawyers. According to the French author, one finds “hidden 
at the bottom of the soul of the American lawyers” (cachée au fond de l’âme des légistes) not 
only the tastes and the habits of the aristocracy, but also “a great repugnance to the actions of 
the multitude, and a secret contempt (méprisent secrètement) of the government of the 
people.” Partly for this reason, Tocqueville goes on to claim, the legal profession constitutes 
the only reliable counterpoise to the democratic tendency of the American society, capable of 
“neutralizing the vices inherent in popular government.” Tocqueville likens the American 
judges and lawyers to a clandestine political party that “extends over the whole community 
and penetrates into each of its classes.” This party has no name, no published program and no 
manifest intentions, but it fashions society “in accordance with its desires,” by acting upon it 
“incessantly and in secret (la travaille en secret)”. 
As we have begun to see, Tocqueville’s lawyer-statesman bears an intriguing 
resemblance to Machiavelli’s prudent man. To be able to act in, and on, democratic society, 
the Tocquevillean wise man must at one and the same time be part of that society, understand 
its inner mechanisms and value system, and stand outside it, as a representative of a higher 
principle and balancing ideal. Let it be called justice. In Tocqueville’s liberal theory, however, 
the prudent man does not operate in the fleeting space between orders. Instead, he has become 
thoroughly institutionalized and his role constitutionally enshrined. But even though 
Tocqueville’s légistes occupy a publicly recognized position and are expected to fulfill their 
constitutional function without venturing outside their respective “circles (cercles)” or 
“spheres (sphères)” of competence, the aristocratic counter-principle they serve remains 
hidden from view. As Tocqueville’s argument suggests, it has been absorbed into the system 
and become part of a continuous self-regulating process, balancing equality with hierarchy, 
innovation with respect for tradition, and expansionism with the defense of liberty. Viewed 
from this perspective, Tocqueville’s liberal theory could be construed, at least in part, as an 
adaptation of Machiavelli’s republican teaching to the new historical circumstances brought 





Nietzsche’s writings invite comparison with those of Machiavelli and Tocqueville for a 
number of reasons. Like them, he offers, especially in The Genealogy of Morals, a general 
outline of the history of Western morality, at least indirectly centered around the classical 
distinction between aristocracy, rooted in a belief in “an elite humanity and higher caste,” and 
democracy, premised on the egalitarian notion of “equality of men.” As a firsthand witness to 
the democratic revolution and the steady advance of equality, Nietzsche shared Tocqueville’s 
preoccuption with the general leveling of European society and the fact that Europeans were 
becoming increasingly similar to each other in their needs, demands and abilities – or lack 
thereof. But while Tocqueville viewed the gradual and progressive development toward social 
equality in terms of progress and, perhaps, providential design, Nietzsche sided with the 
aristocratic reaction, in regarding it as both a cause and a symptom of decadence. With 
horrified eyes he observed how the mass of uprooted and indistinguishable men were seeking 
to reduce society to complete conformity by imposing on it a single, monolithic herd morality, 
designed to tame, domesticate and train men for a life in comfort and stultifying mediocrity. 
Nietzsche’s characterization of the herd and its slave morality is well-known and need 
not detain us here. However, to understand his fierce critique of democracy, we need to place 
it in the wider context of his rejection of the doctrine of human equality. For Nietzsche, 
humanity is not one and undivided. At times he even doubts that it exists at all, as he in 
Darwinist language prefers to classify living beings – be it men or animals – in a rank of order 
based on whether and to what extent they embody growth or decay, ascending or descending 
life. The herd instinct and the slave morality are two of the most advanced expressions of 
declining life. Based on ressentiment, and the hunger for revenge that the sick, the degenerate 
and the ugly harbor toward the healthy, the flourishing and the spiritually less limited, they 
are driven by pure negativity. They negate values without creating new ones. In themselves, 
the herd is simply nothing, a “sum of zeroes – where every zero has ‘equal rights.’” To 
conceal this daunting fact, from others and themselves, the herd has cunningly concocted the 
idea of all men being created equal. Like many other so-called democratic ‘values’ this “the 
greatest of all lies” , “the most dangerous of all possible evaluations” and the most poisonous 
of poisons can be traced back to Christian dogma; in this case, the doctrine of the equality of 
all men before God. Nietzsche writes:  
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... men, not noble enough to see the abysmally different order of rank, chasm of rank, 
between man and man – such men have so far held sway over the fate of Europe, with 
their ‘equal before God,’ until finally a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, 
something eager to please, sickly, and mediocre has been bred, the European of today. 
 
Christianity here reveals itself to be “the counter-principle,” or Gegenlehre, to the aristocratic 
principle of selection. But with the imminent, or ongoing, death of God – caused by the 
weakening of the herd’s will and its diminishing ability to believe – this whole edifice is 
destined to come tumbling down. It will then become clear that men, stripped of their 
ideological clothing, are not equal by nature, and “the unique and incomparable” will yet 
again be able to “raise its head” and to reclaim its right to affirm, to create values, to make 
distinctions and to rule. 
Nietzsche’s categoric rejection of equality also goes a long way to explain his lack of 
appreciation for the mixed republic that we have seen being endorsed by Machiavelli and 
Tocqueville. Whereas Machiavelli’s prudenti and Tocqueville’s légistes were expected to 
serve justice and the common good within republics that combined and balanced these two 
interests, Nietzsche has nothing but ridicule for these traditional republican values. For him 
the common good is a contradiction in terms, since “whatever can be common always has 
little value”. He exhorts his select readers, the philosophers of the future, to beware of the 
levelers (die Nivellirer) who, spurred on by the rallying cries of “equality of rights” and 
“sympathy for all that suffers,” set out to achieve “the universal green-pasture happiness of 
the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort and an easier life for everyone.” Against this, 
Nietzsche musters his own aristocratic counter-teaching, based on noble values such as “the 
power of commanding; the sense of reverence, subservience, ability to keep silent; great 
passion, the great task, tragedy, cheerfulness.” 
On occasion, Nietzsche argues that the partiality of the higher men and their disregard 
for the lower contains a “necessary injustice ... inseparable from life,” which itself is 
“conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice.”. At other times, he defines justice 
as the selfish pursuit and elevated egoism of “the noble soul”. While justice is a meaningful 
concept between elevated individuals of equal rank, inter pares, the herd or the many, who 
are nothing and whose value is naught, have simply no part or place in justice. Since they 
have no weight, they cannot enter into a balancing relationship with other forces or elements.  
But Nietzsche’s frontal attack on the democratic principle that Machiavelli and 
Tocqueville had understood to accomodate in their respective republican theories, does not 
stop here. Nietzsche’s imagined ruling caste – “the strong and independent who are prepared 
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and predestined to command and in whom the reason and art of governing race become 
incarnate” – are to rule for their own sake and not for that of the community at large. Nothing 
should be negotiated downward, no obligation should bind the ruling few to the many, and 
there should most definitely be no question of “the higher species ... leading the lower”. 
Above all, the higher should watch out for the traps set by the herd, who, we are warned, 
deceitfully will seek to persuade “the stronger, more powerful, wiser, and more fruitful” to 
assume “the role of guardians, herdsmen, watchmen, [and] to become its first servants”. 
Turning the traditional analogy of the statesman as physician on its head, Nietzsche argues 
that the healthy should not act as physicians of the sick. “That the sick should not make the 
healthy sick,” he writes, “should surely be our supreme concern on earth; but this requires 
above all that the healthy should be segregated from the sick”. The higher should thus not 
adapt to the lower, or serve them, but the other way around. In Nietzsche’s ruling class, there 
is – and must be – no sense of service, no gratitude towards those who have made their 
greatness possible, only the hard-nosed awareness that the lower must be maintained, because 
they are the “base upon which higher species performs its own tasks – upon which alone it can 
stand.” 
 
Here I will not go into the wide range of strategies Nietzsche devises for how the few should 
establish their rule, how they should stay aloof, how they should widen and maintain the gap 
between themselves and the herd below, even though this is a dimension of his work that 
should give pause to those who wish to see him as a proto-liberal thinker or insist on reading 
him as an anti-political philosopher. 
Instead I want to conclude with a few brief remarks on the role of the aristocratic 
principle in Nietzsche’s work. As we have come to see, Nietzsche’s deep-seated contempt for 
the masses, and his dreams about a society, or an order of things, where a natural hierarchy is 
universally acknowledged, where the Higher man rules by a perceived natural right and where 
the philosopher is free to experiment with his life above and aloof from the multitude, contrast 
sharply with Machiavelli’s and Tocqueville’s advocacy of a broadly based and well-balanced 
republic. On the basis of these observations, it could be tempting to dismiss Nietzsche’s 
political philosophy as “unsound,” “crude” or “uninteresting” as has all too often been done. 
However, a more constructive approach might be to ask what, if anything, we can learn from 
Nietzsche and from radical political thought in general. For one, Nietzsche reminds us of the 
shaping force of principle which is easily denied or overlooked in a political culture 
characterized by concessions and trade-offs, compromises and consensus. For here we are 
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confronted with someone who conceives of the world in terms of principle and counter-
principle, Lehre and Gegenlehre, and who has fully committed himself to one of these 
principles – in Nietzsche’s case, aristocracy at the expense of democracy – and allowed 
himself to be shaped by it. But why would this personal subordination to principle be so 
important, you may ask. Part of the answer, I believe, has been suggested previously in 
connection to Tocqueville. For while the aristocratic principle we encounter in Tocqueville’s 
analysis is largely depersonalized, disembodied, institutionalized and almost hidden from 
view, the one we see surface in Nietzsche’s writings is deeply personal, passionate, somatic 
and uncompromisingly candid. In Nietzsche, we seem to experience the aristocratic principle 
resurge, unchecked and energized by the passions with which it traditionally has been 
associated – pride, arrogance, aloofness, contempt, thirst for glory and greatness, 
instinctiveness, courage, certitude, cruelty and pitilessness, etc. It is perhaps paradoxical that 
the aristocratic principle in this its most personalized and radical form should seem to dissolve 
and transform itself into a set of aggressively inscribed character traits, erratic and 
frustratingly contradictory in their expression. Aristocracy, it could be argued, is the sign or 
the star under which Nietzsche writes, and the generative principle that gives unity, coherence 
and force to his otherwise fragmentary and conceptually confounding work. From his 
exclusively aristocratic and radically one-sided perspective it is only natural and inevitable 
that democratic notions such as solidarity, pity, public opinion, equal rights and social justice 
should come to appear as completely devoid of meaning and merit. What is at stake in reading 
Nietzsche is thus the value of the aristocratic principle itself, and how we view his work, I 
would argue, is intimately linked to how we look upon this principle and all that it represents. 
Some might say that it is only for the better that the old nobility and all that it stood for have 
disappeared, or at least is in the process of doing so: “We simply cannot have too much of 
democracy or of equality, Nietzsche’s radical aristocratism is monstruous and the egalitarian 
principle is in any case and under all circumstances superior and the one to be preferred.” But 
that position, in my view, is not only openly contradictory but also fundamentally flawed and 
mistaken. For as Tocqueville has emphatically shown, the aristocratic principle is not to be 
confused with, and does not necessarily presuppose, an aristocratic class or a caste society. 
Instead of substituting the monopoly of one principle and one set of values for the other, we 
should give serious consideration to the more complex approaches outlined by Machiavelli 
and Tocqueville. In this case, the question should not be democracy or aristocracy, but, from a 
modern republican perspective, how to deal with the aristocratic challenge that Nietzsche’s 
work poses, how to contain it, articulate it, restrain it, cultivate it, etc. Because Nietzsche not 
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only reminds us of the personal and individualistic dimensions of this principle, but also of 
the dire consequences that could result if it is allowed to go unchecked and uncontested. 
 
